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Abstract
This paper explores the co-evolution of product and industry architecture by drawing on a longitudinal study
of the UK personal pensions industry between 2005 and 2020. It provides qualitative evidence for the way
in which institutional structures, particularly regulation, entwine with firm strategic choices to shape the
contours of an industry value chain (IVC). We draw upon modularity theory and the literature on industry
architecture to consider how strategic bottlenecks emerged and how value shifted between layers of the IVC.
Furthermore, we examine the interplay between the agendas of the regulator and firm strategic responses to
unpack how firms (product providers) responded by pursuing integrative innovation and less specialization to
mitigate the effects of value migration to strategic bottlenecks. Our findings extend recent work on product
and industry architecture, highlighting how markets evolve toward less modular product configurations and
less industry specialization in response to these dynamics.
JEL classification: D21, L22, O32

1. Introduction
Product modularization and specialization emerged in the UK personal pensions sector in the
early 1990s (Burton, 2018). This paper focuses on the trajectory of this process between 2005
and 2020, looking particularly at the impact of regulatory philosophy on swings toward and
away from modularization and specialization, and the role played by strategic bottlenecks in
shaping product and industry architecture.
The evolution of product architectures can be traced back to Simon’s (1962) work on hierarchy and systems. Subsequent research on product modularity has occurred across a wide variety
of contexts such as motor vehicles (Argyres and Bigelow, 2010; MacDuffie, 2013), computers (Baldwin and Clark, 2000), software (MacCormack et al., 2012), semiconductors (Funk,
2008), and bicycles (Galvin and Morkel, 2001). Across these different studies and contexts, a
modular product architecture has often resulted in corresponding changes in industry architecture, with firms becoming specialized and new entrant firms emerging in the industry value chain
(IVC). However, evolutionary analysis is increasingly shifting to the way entire sectors and their
architectures co-evolve (Jacobides et al., 2018), providing the motivation for our paper.
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It is often remarked that product architectures transition to more modular configurations, with
corresponding firm specialization (e.g., Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010; Sorkun and Furlan,
2017) influencing firm-level outcomes (Galvin et al., 2020). Langlois and Robertson (1992)
argued that modular product architectures benefit firms in two complementary ways: on the
supply side through greater specialization and on the demand side through mixing and matching
components to fine-tune a product to consumer needs. Extending analysis to vertical disintegration, Jacobides (2005) examined the US mortgage banking industry and identified gains from
specialization and gains from trade as the sparks of a process that drives vertical unbundling.
When such gains are available, firms engage in intra-organizational partitioning and vertical
co-specialization to reduce coordination complexity and task interdependence.
We were intrigued by the potential for product configurations to become less modular and
industries less specialized. For example, Fixson and Park (2008) examined the case of Shimano in
the bicycle industry. They explained how designer’s seeking value drove a reintegration process of
bicycle drivetrain components in response to consumer demands in the high-performance segment
of the market, while the vast majority of the industry remained specialized and the product
configuration remained modular. Shifting the unit of analysis to the industry level, Cacciatori
and Jacobides (2005) highlighted how capability gaps led to all-in-one providers emerging in the
UK construction industry. Furthermore, Jacobides and Winter (2005) examined the Swiss watch
industry and found that the emergence of a new technology engineered by vertically integrated
rivals undermined the competitive position of the “old” technology and the existing specialized
structure of the industry.
Building on these unusual cases, we present modularity theory as a lens through which to
understand the various design choices available to firms (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Tee, 2019).
Using a longitudinal study of the complex UK personal pensions industry, we advance existing
research on product and industry co-evolution by unpacking the role of regulation and the related
technological choices of firms. Regulators rely heavily on private actors for detailed understandings of technology and market dynamics. Existing scholarship has, therefore, often portrayed
regulators as “followers” of the private sector, struggling to keep pace with technological and
industry dynamics. Moreover, according to (Jacobides and Lianos 2021a: 1122) private firms
strive to “set the rules of the game that they themselves were playing.” However, regulators
often have their own agendas (Wishnick, 2020) to reshape the design of markets and influence
levels of competition and innovation and to reshape business models. Given this complex interplay between endogeneity and strategic choices of firms and the exogenous agendas of regulators
and policy, it is surprising that research into the extent to which institutional structures, such as
regulation, shape the nature of market dynamics and technological choices is under-elaborated,
despite influencing the agency of firms and their incentives and design choices (see Jacobides et al.,
2014, 2006; Skold et al., 2020). This fundamentally motivated our exploratory research question: how do regulation and technology shape product and industry co-evolution in regulated
markets?
Our findings highlight how the pensions product architecture initially shifted toward a modular configuration and then in a subsequent period reversed toward a less modular configuration.
In considering these counterpoise transitions, we highlight three key contributions. First, we
demonstrate how shifts in regulation and regulatory philosophy influenced technological choices
and created forces that pushed the industry toward more modular product configurations and
specialization. We then highlight the limits to this process as a result of the emergence of strategic
bottlenecks in the specialized IVC. This allows us to theorize how they emerge and are protected
and how firms respond. In so doing, we present a deeper understanding of how firms, which
retained integrative capabilities in the modular phase, could better utilize integrative innovation
and an expanded vertical scope, to mitigate the effects of strategic bottlenecks and reimagine how
surplus was divided. This enables us to show how value capture between IVC layers changed over
time in response to changes in regulation and technology and how product providers utilized the
systemic modularity of the product system and (re)integrated governance to (re)capture value.
We also draw attention to the interplay between the regulators’ ambition to influence competitive dynamics, innovation, and the business models of firms and the resultant strategic choices of
firms in the sector.

1058

N. Burton and P. Galvin

Using an inductive approach, our paper offers a selective review of the literature, before
describing the requisite research methods needed to explore the complexities of the regulatory
changes in the industry leading up to 2005 and beyond and the subsequent consequences of these
for the industry. Our findings, supported by insights from experienced industry professionals, are
followed by an extended discussion and a critical agenda for future research pathways.

Firms make product design choices with differing appropriation prospects in the context of existing capabilities and the shape of the industry architecture (Jacobides et al., 2006). At one end of
a continuum, modular products define the relationships between components and interfaces such
that components may be designed and produced independently by separate groups, strategic business units, or firms (Schilling and Steensma, 2001). An important feature of modular products is
the way in which they enable firms to design components autonomously and simultaneously, so
long as they adhere to stable design rules (Baldwin, 2020). At the other end of the continuum,
integrated products incorporate components that are interdependent and connect together via
interfaces that are specialized or idiosyncratic (Sanchez, 2008) and are often designed by firms
in the initial stages of the product lifecycle (Tee, 2019).
Existing scholarship has typically argued that the evolution of product architecture shifts from
one of “complex, non-standard interfaces, through simple company-wide standard interfaces and
ultimately to industry-wide standards” (Shibata et al., 2005: 15). Corresponding with this shift
toward more modular product architectures featuring industry standards (Sanchez, 2008), an
IVC co-evolves to feature greater levels of co-specialization as intermediate markets mature and
gains from specialization and trade become available (Jacobides, 2005).
Despite this common, but not universal, trajectory, products can also evolve toward being
less modular and industries less specialized, especially in cases where the limits to modularity are
reached (Brusoni, 2005), such as complex coordination (Ernst, 2005), innovation complexity
(Brusoni et al., 2007; Rivkin, 2000), competency traps (Zirpoli and Becker, 2011), or commoditization (Pil and Cohen, 2006). Some authors have argued that an evolution toward less product
modularity may be initiated by firm choices. Henderson and Clark (1990) asserted that reintegration is possible following an architectural shift in product technologies. Others have suggested the
primacy of demand-side processes, such as changes in consumer preferences (e.g., Christensen
et al., 2002). Fixson and Park (2008) studied Shimano in the bicycle industry and remarked
that integrative innovation occurred in response to consumer demands in the high-performance
segment of the market. Furthermore, Dietl et al. (2009) noted different “architectures of value
creation” in the European car industry and emphasized how Mercedes was able to pursue a
differentiated strategy through higher levels of integration.
These same design choices often influence industry architecture. There are a number of potential industry architectures that may feasibly exist, (Jacobides, 2008) and the architecture that
comes to structure an IVC may be partly designed (via regulation or standards) or may otherwise
emerge through a range of “technological, institutional or social artefacts that allow for two or
more independent entities to divide labor” (Jacobides et al., 2006: 1203). Changes in industry
architecture are largely driven by the capabilities of firms (Jacobides and Hitt, 2005), the extent of
transaction costs (Baldwin, 2008; Argyres and Zenger, 2012), or managerial attempts to shape
value capture (Jacobides et al., 2016). Jacobides et al. (2006) suggest that firms can navigate
changes in industry architecture through acquiring an “architectural advantage” related to pursuing high levels of complementarity (e.g., between assets and activities, see Argyres and Zenger,
2012) and high levels of asset mobility with low switching costs. Similarly, a firm in a layer of
an IVC can achieve an architectural advantage and position itself as a bottleneck in the development and delivery of a product and thereby disproportionately capture value relative to other
players (Jacobides et al., 2006; Jacobides and Tae, 2015; Masucci et al., 2020). As an industry
architecture evolves, opportunities for firms to position themselves as bottlenecks emerge (Pisano
and Teece, 2007; Baldwin, 2015), and the pursuit of a bottleneck strategy (Baldwin, 2015, 2020;
Hannah and Eisenhardt, 2018) can enable such firms to control resources, limit market access,
or leverage power over other firms (Jacobides and Tae, 2015).
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3. Regulatory context
Regulation typically aims to ensure the efficient performance of a market and to promote competition and innovation, while generating welfare outcomes for stakeholders (Llewellyn, 1999;
Brousseau and Glachant, 2011). Financial services is a complex sector prone to periods of instability. The principal regulator of UK pensions is the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and,
for occupational and workplace pensions, The Pensions Regulator. Firms are also subject to
extensive and diverse European Commission directives, in relation to matters such as fund management, financial markets regulations, anti-money laundering measures, and ensuring that the
products sold meet consumers’ needs. The sheer complexity and range of this regulation is beyond
the scope of this paper; however, we briefly outline the key regulatory landscape that has shaped
the sector.
Between 1986 and 2013, the then primary UK financial regulator, the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) (predecessor to the FCA) based its regulatory activities upon a precautionary
principle and the ex post minimization of harmful and anti-competitive practice. When pursuing
its policy goals, the regulator sought to correct market imperfections by issuing compliance rules
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To date, the work of Baldwin and Clark (2000) is perhaps the most detailed. Their longitudinal study of the computer industry highlighted that the resulting changes in the industry
structure impacted the distribution of value across the IVC (such as semiconductors versus computer manufacturers). Existing explanations for shifts toward less industry specialization have
centered around the need to address capability gaps (Cacciatori and Jacobides, 2005; Jacobides
and Winter, 2005). Beyond these explanations, Kapoor (2013) studied firm-level data from the
semiconductor industry to highlight how integrated incumbents were able to initiate systemic
innovations. An exploration of the global automotive industry by Jacobides et al. (2016) detailed
how the industry architecture shifted to a modular and specialized structure in the late 1990s, but
it failed to create value and risked handing power and influence to other firms. However, firms in
the sector reversed the trajectory of the product architecture to less modularity to reassert their
dominance.
The effect of regulation on industrial and competitive dynamics, however, is severely underelaborated, despite regulation playing a crucial role in many industries (Jacobides et al., 2006,
2014; Freij, 2021). Regulatory philosophy often adopts a precautionary perspective by seeking
to deter harmful practices or anti-competitive behavior from entrenched incumbents (Jacobides
and Lianos, 2021a), reducing the risk profile of systemic actors (Jacobides et al., 2014), and
providing robustness and stability to future shocks (León and Berndsen, 2014). Furthermore,
where regulators ex ante define the rules of the game, they can also actively encourage structural
competition and innovation. Through influencing market dynamics, the effect of regulation can
also extend to influencing product design, often reflecting concerns for unbundling (Freij, 2021),
but also the way in which entire sectors are architected and evolve across time (Freij, 2018). For
instance, Jacobides et al. (2006) acknowledged that regulation acts as an institutional interface
that influences the industry architecture and moderates the division of labor. Given the interest
of regulators in competitive dynamics and innovation, as well as systemic resilience, there are
overlaps between modularity theory and regulatory policy (Farrell and Weiser, 2003; Haldane
and May, 2011; Yoo, 2016), and a number of scholars have remarked how regulators can leverage modularity theory to reconfigure and open up markets and encourage innovation (Brousseau
and Glachant, 2011), while providing systemic resilience and robustness (León and Berndsen,
2014). More recently, the features of modularity theory and architectural regulation have been
noted by a number of scholars to explain agendas and tensions in literatures on platforms and
ecosystems (e.g., Jacobides and Lianos, 2021a,b; Jenny, 2021).
Building on this theoretical foundation, we recognize that design choices may co-evolve toward
and away from modularity and specialization. A missing piece of the jigsaw is how do changes
in regulation affect such pathways and more specifically how does the interplay between regulator ambitions and the strategic choices of firms play out in terms of product and industry
co-evolution. To explore this, we briefly look next at the regulatory context for personal pensions
in the UK.
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3.1 The pensions context: leading up to 2005
The UK pensions sector has often been at the center of regulatory concerns (Hannah, 1986),
in particular mis-selling scandals in the 1990s (Ward, 2000). The UK Government legislated
for a new personal pensions regime in the Financial Services Act, 1986, implemented in 1988
(Burton, 2018). The new personal pension product was launched simultaneously alongside a
strong economic outlook and generous tax incentives for consumers that ultimately created a
boom in the demand for personal pensions (Burton, 1994). Pensions regulation aimed to “free
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and bringing enforcement for non-compliance against firms. The FSA had four statutory objectives: the protection of consumers; integrity in the financial system; reducing financial crime; and
promoting public understanding of financial services. The emphasis of these regulatory objectives foregrounded a welfare approach to “protecting consumers” and ensuring firms provided
consumers with standardized and comparable information about prices, product features, and
key risks in order to facilitate rational and informed decision-making (Callaghan, 2013, 2014).
Since the financial crisis of 2008, the landscape of the financial services market has been
changing due to an overhaul in regulation philosophy (Anagnostopoulos, 2018), and financial
regulation has been transformed by at least three interdependent factors—innovation, modularity, and digital technologies (Brousseau and Glachant, 2011). Drawing upon the principles of
the deregulation and liberalization agendas of earlier years, the regulator reflected an interest
in industry architecture reform—an approach to architectural regulation that Wishnick (2020)
noted in US financial markets. The regulator sought to reshape the design of financial markets and
influence levels of competition and innovation, as well as to reshape business models, “spurred on
by the concerns over rent-seeking from entrenched incumbents” (Jacobides and Lianos, 2021a:
1132). While ex post correction of errors was governed through sanctions, architectural regulation, on the other hand, was constituted by creating ex ante rules of the game that applied
to actors and regulated behavior among the various “layers” and “components” of the market
(Farrell and Weiser, 2003; Wishnick, 2020).
By 2013, the UK Government phased out the FSA and shifted its functions to the Bank of
England and a number of new regulators, such as the FCA, signaling a continuation of its commitment to mitigate systemic risk while fostering competition and innovation. The corresponding
Financial Services Act, 2012, imposed a duty on the FCA to actively promote competition in
the interests of consumers (FCA, 2017) through championing consumer choice and product
portability, encouraging innovative markets, partly through the constitution of regulatory sandboxes that facilitate innovation, experimentation, and reciprocal learning between regulator and
firms (Jacobides and Lianos, 2021a,b), tackling anti-competitive conduct, and intervening, if
necessary, ex post to ensure competitive forces drive good outcomes for consumers (p.8). The
FCA’s subsequent 2017 manifesto, “Our Approach to Competition” noted how “changing the
rules of the game can have a significant impact on how firms compete, and thus on consumer
outcomes” (p.8). Moreover, the “duty to promote competition” had much in common with
the features of modularity theory, and the FCA described its regulatory levers as an ability to
limit market concentration and market power by removing barriers to entry and barriers to
switching; limiting anti-competitive behavior such as self-preferencing; ensuring transparent price
discrimination and access to comparable information; and reducing overall product complexity. Overall, these levers, according to the FCA, are aimed at enabling rather than hindering
innovation.
The complementarity between modularity theory and regulatory policy has been noted in
financial markets and other contexts (Farrell and Weiser, 2003; Haldane and May, 2011).
While Yoo (2016) noted that regulators may have “pro-modularity bias,” León and Berndsen
(2014) suggested that regulation developed from modularity theory supports market resilience
by limiting cascades and isolating negative feedback (Haldane and May, 2011) in localized components and firms. Thus, modularity protects systemic resilience and provides robustness and
stability to future shocks (León and Berndsen, 2014). Furthermore, Brousseau and Glachant
(2011) suggested that modularity could create “openness of reconfiguration” and perpetuate
competition.
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1 Collective investment schemes are pooled funds, similar to mutual funds in the USA. They are designed by
fund management firms often in accordance with transnational standards, such as the UCITS (Undertakings Collective
Investments in Transferable Securities). UCITS are investment funds, regulated at a European Union (EU) level. In
creating a set of common rules and regulations it allows such funds: to seek a single authorization in one EU member
state and to register for sale and market across EU member states.
2 The “technical incompatibilities” relate to the 1997 changes in pension fund taxation. Prior to 1997, pension
funds were incompatible with collective investment schemes and could not be mixed and matched. In 2000, firms were
working through the complexities of resolving these technical incompatibilities.
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up the market and to come down heavily on malpractice” (Hudson et al., 1996: 218) through
enforcement.
Following the personal pension regime launched in 1988, product modularization and specialization emerged in the sector in the 1990s (Burton, 2018). The Financial Services Act, 1986,
imposed significant compliance costs that significantly increased the costs of owning distribution, resulting in product providers closing down their distribution, and which resulted in the
emergence of independent financial advisor (IFA) firms in an intermediate market. Furthermore,
financialization had created a demand-side impetus for personal investments and stock ownership, fueled by waves of privatization, and in response product providers moved to co-create
technical standards with third-party fund management firms to widen the choice of investments
available to consumers. As a consequence, by the late 1990s the IVC followed a simple specialized
structure as shown in Figure 1.
Significant waves of regulatory and fiscal policy change occurred between 1997 and 2006, as
the FSA began to change its regulatory philosophy. The first significant fiscal change related to
how pension funds were taxed. Branded a “tax raid on pensions,” the UK Government removed
the 10% tax credit on dividends that could be reclaimed by pension fund managers, thereby
making pension funds less tax-efficient and, moreover, tax-equivalent to collective investment
schemes.1 The consequence of this policy change was significant. Prior to this, product providers
offered a relatively small range of tax-advantaged pension funds offered by in-house fund management teams and/or third-party investment management firms. As pension funds were no
longer tax-advantageous for consumers, and the demand environment necessitated increased
choice, product providers connected pension products to thousands of collective investment
schemes, developed in line with UCITS industry standards, offered by external fund management firms. The UCITS standards enabled product providers to expand to offer thousands of
investments funds within just a few years.
The second significant change related to policy changes in the wider savings and investments
sector, which later had significant implications for the “platforming” of the sector. In 1999,
regulations were introduced that permitted an Individual Savings Account (ISA), a tax-efficient
savings account that could also be invested in collective investment schemes, without the constraints of limiting access to the capital until retirement in the way a pension does (Emmerson
and Tanner, 2000). With a policy aim of increasing the UK savings ratio, initially contributions
were limited to £7000 per year, an amount which was indexed in line with the Consumer Prices
Index each year.
In anticipation of the ISA, an incumbent pensions firm, Skandia Life, launched a multi-product
platform, known by the regulator as a “fund supermarket.” The fund supermarket encompassed
a common range of thousands of collective investment funds that could either be “wrapped”
in an ISA or held in an investment portfolio and linked to complementary components such as
portfolio management modeling software. In this first wave, however, personal pensions were
designed “off-platform” due to technical incompatibilities.2 Many fund management firms in
the IVC (e.g., Fidelity Investments) also saw the ISA as an opportunity to forward integrate
into product provision. Four early movers initially dominated the fund supermarket landscape
(Skandia Life [now Old Mutual], Fidelity Investments, Transact, and CoFunds [now Aegon];
The Lang Cat, 2019). The IVC of the “fund supermarket” model followed this specialized
structure as shown in Figure 2.
While the sector had already begun to adopt increasing product modularity and industry specialization, the influence of modularity theory on regulation philosophy came to the fore around
2001, as the FSA sought to pursue aims of unbundling to reduce pensions complexity and to
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FUND MANAGEMENT GROUPS
(e.g., Fidelity, M&G, Jupiter, JP Morgan)
Key capability: investment management

PRODUCT PROVIDERS
(e.g., Standard Life, AXA, Sco sh
Equitable, Aviva, Pruden al)
Key capability: product design and
management; stakeholder management;
accounts, ﬁnancial, investment and
money management; business and
technical administra on; security, systems
Typical share of IVC revenues: 50%

DISTRIBUTORS (IFAS)
(e.g., fragmented small ﬁrms)
Key capability: product/investment advice
Typical share of IVC revenues: 25%

CONSUMERS
Self-employed and mass aﬄuent consumers
Figure 1. Typical IVC structure (late 1990s)

limit rent-seeking by powerful firms. In 2001, Stakeholder Pensions3 were introduced with a
central objective to change the ratio of state to private pension provision from 60:40 to 40:60
3 A Stakeholder Pension is a “defined contribution personal pension. They have low and flexible minimum
contributions [and] capped charges” (Money Advice Service).
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FUND MANAGEMENT
GROUPS
(e.g., Fidelity, M&G, Jupiter,
JP Morgan)
Key capability: investment
management

INVESTMENT DATA
(e.g., Standards & Poor)

(e.g., E-value)
Key capability: investment
management
Typical share of IVC
revenues: transac onbased

Key capability: data
provision/ aggrega on
Typical share of IVC
revenues: minimal

PRODUCT PROVIDERS
Some fund
management
groups
forward
integrate to
pension and
ISA provision

(e.g., Skandia, CoFunds, Fidelity, Transact)
Key capability: product design and
management; stakeholder management;
accounts, ﬁnancial, investment and money
management; business and technical
administra on; security, systems
Typical share of IVC revenues:40%

DISTRIBUTORS (IFAS)
(e.g., various SMEs)
Key capability: product/investment advice
Typical share of IVC revenues: 25%

CONSUMERS
Self-employed and mass aﬄuent consumers
NOTE: Key features of regulatory change from Figure 1 to Figure 2:
• 1997: Fiscal changes to pension fund taxa on = collec ve investments tax-equivalent to unitlinked pension funds = collec ve investments can be held tax-eﬃciently in pensions for ﬁrst
me = massive expansion of permi ed investments in pensions and emergence of ‘product
families’ based on common components
• 1999: Launch of Individual Savings Account (ISA) = mainstream way to invest tax-eﬃciently in
collec ve investments
• 2001: Stakeholder pensions launched = price cap = signiﬁcant pressure on produc on margin
Figure 2. Typical IVC structure (fund supermarket architecture c2000–2005)

by 2050 to address the so-called pensions time bomb (House of Commons, 2001). Stakeholder
Pensions were a “benchmarked personal pension” (Banks and Emmerson, 2000: 46): a simple
1% per year charge, low minimum premiums to widen access, and easy portability. While the
Stakeholder Pension was successful in some respects, there is little evidence that it reduced complexity (Waine, 2006), although it significantly reduced the profitability of product providers.
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4. Method
This study is a snapshot that forms part of a much larger study carried out to examine changes
in the sector between the mid-1980s and 2020. We selected this industry precisely because it had
undergone numerous periods of regulatory change. More importantly our choices were framed by
the fact that modularity scholars have largely ignored “intangible” products emphasizing (almost
exclusively) manufacturing industries (see Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010 for a review).
Answering “how” and “why” questions demanded examining phenomena from the perspective of the lived experience of those working in the industry. Data come from a longitudinal
study conducted in two phases in 2014 and 2020, using semi-structured interviews at different
4 For an overview of the issues relating to simplification, see https://www.insurancetimes.co.uk/sandler-reporturges-simplification/1348049.article.
5 For further information, see https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn03697/.
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The 2002 Sandler report on “Medium and Long-Term Retail Savings in the UK,”4 recognized
that “Pensions taxation is extremely complex and this has a number of effects…[it] leads to confusion both for the public and professionals; [and] this is a disincentive for saving” (House of
Commons Library, 2008: 3).
To further address complexity and unbundling, regulations known as “pensions simplification” were announced in 2003, implemented in 2006, and developed a single set of pension rules
replacing a myriad of hundreds of existing and highly complex rules. Pensions simplification
created a single architecture of regulatory standards for (nearly) all new and existing pension
products. In anticipation of pensions simplification, many incumbent product providers had recognized, however, that the changes to the taxation of pension funds in 1997 meant that the “fund
supermarket” business model could be reengineered by extending collective investment schemes
to pensions. Until pensions simplification was announced in 2003 and implemented in 2006,
however, there had been little impetus to do so as incumbent product providers already held the
majority of pension assets and benefited from the corresponding rents. However, the risks and
opportunities presented by the pensions simplification architecture fundamentally changed this
dynamic.
Pensions simplification was recognized as an opportunity not just for simplification but for
pensions consolidation. The industry recognized that a flexible modular product architecture
could tempt existing consumers to consolidate their myriad of legacy pensions into a single product, making it easier for consumers to keep track of their pension, ISAs, and other investments
together in a single investment platform. Until pensions simplification, product providers had
largely ignored a niche pension product, known as the self-invested personal pension (SIPP)5
which was originally legislated in 1989, but which now received renewed attention. In anticipation of simplification, product providers recognized that the SIPP could provide the modular
architecture to profit from the anticipated consolidation wave. However, to leverage the opportunities a technological shift away from legacy systems designed around pension funds to a
multi-product platform architecture was required. With pensions simplification set for 2006,
consolidation meant both a vast business opportunity (for the winners) and a significant risk to
firms’ embedded value (for the losers), and speed to market was critical, and this regulatory event
provides a relevant starting point for our study.
The UK pensions sector is subject to extensive and dynamic regulation that provides a unique
context in which to explore its effect on product and industry co-evolution. This complexity,
particularly over the past three decades, means that secondary data alone are not enough to
adequately tell the story. While secondary data provide breadth, they do not allow for the depth
required to deeply understand the forces shaping the industry. Our rationale for methodological
choices is predicated by the valuable opportunities that unusual cases offer for theory-building
(Fixson and Park, 2008). We use a case analysis of the industry between 2005 and 2020 to explore
the mechanisms that lead to more or less modularity and more or less industry specialization and
to illuminate the interplay between the agenda of the regulator and the strategic choices made by
firms in the sector.
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•
•
•
•
•

Mid- to late 1980s: Integrated product.
Early to mid-1990s: Closed and modular product.
Mid-1990s to 2005: Hybrid product.
2005–2012: Modular product.
2012–2014: Hybrid product.

When we re-interviewed in 2020, we repeated the process and explored the period 2014–2020.
We were able to discern the following:
• 2014–2015: Hybrid product.6
• 2015–2020: Hybrid product.

The sub-periods served as a useful structure for the second part of the interview in which
we asked a series of open-ended questions such as: “What was going on in this time period?”;
“What led to this change?”; and “What was the result of this change?”. Periodization provided
a structure for inductive logic to be used to derive key themes in each time period.
Following transcription of the interviews, we used template analysis, a flexible type of thematic
analysis, developed by King (1998; 2012) to code the interview data. We followed the approach
suggested by King and Horrocks (2010) and further elaborated by Burton and Galvin (2018a),
in combining a matrix and template analysis method. Our initial coding of early interviews highlighted that themes were clearly emerging at three different units of analysis: industry level; firm
level; and product design. This enabled us to create a matrix to thematically code further interview data, with periodization and units of analysis providing the x and y axes of our matrix,
respectively. This enabled us to code responses to each cell of the matrix to understand the relationship between different time periods and links between themes across time. Each interview
transcript was coded separately, one at a time, by both authors, and differences in coding were
resolved through inter-coder dialogue and discussion (Miles et al., 2013). Where new themes
emerged or other changes to the templates were made, previously analyzed interview transcripts
were re-examined, and this iterative process continued. Finally, we reviewed our template for
integrative themes that related to our research question.
This process was supplemented by secondary data obtained by searching a range of publications from the FCA, trade media, and other financial media such as the Financial Times and
6 An extension of the 2012–2014 period described by participants in the first set of interviews in 2014.
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units of analysis about product architectures, firms, and industry structure. We initially recruited
31 senior managers, from six product provider firms via LinkedIn, who self-reported professional experience that continuously spanned the entire period. All held a strategic role in product
development, systems, investment management, or actuarial.
We held follow-up interviews by video call during 2020 with 19 of the original participants
who remained in the industry. We began the interviews by describing that we were interested in
the evolution of products and the sector. Thus, we informed participants about the broad scope
of our interests and located the interview within the field of product and industry evolution,
but allowed any connection to technology, regulation, or other factors to emerge spontaneously.
Follow-up questions also varied in each interview in order to allow us to more deeply explore
specific topics of importance.
In both sets of interviews, the structure was divided into two consecutive parts. First, we
invited participants to “chunk” the time period into meaningful sub-periods. Then we asked
them to describe the product artifact pertaining to each time sub-period. To assist participants, we
provided a stylized product architecture typology (see, Burton and Galvin, 2020). This process
of “chunking” is an example of “temporal bracketing” (Langley, 1999) that aims to identify
meaningful time units within a stream of longitudinal or historical data. We found that there was
a significant degree of commonality in the periodization across participants and the identification
of product types. The following five sub-periods and product architecture types emerged:
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Citywire. Using keywords that related to our study, we created a database of articles and publications and arranged them by year of publication date. Following, we reviewed each deposit in
the database for applicability to our research question. Finally, we were able to access privileged
market and technical reports produced by two leading consultancy firms to the sector.

5.1 The shift toward more modularity (2005–2012)
While four early movers dominated the fund supermarket landscape in the early 2000s, by 2005
the number of fund supermarkets in the sector had increased to 13 (The Lang Cat, 2020), as new
entrants and incumbents entered the sector. By this time, around 40% of advised new business
and existing assets were now held on fund supermarkets (The Platforum, 2015). The IVC was
predominantly specialized, with each layer focusing on areas of distinctive capability. A few
product providers occupied two segments of the IVC, often by way of in-house fund management,
but most firms sourced investment funds from specialized third-party fund management firms.
Distribution was almost exclusively through third-party IFA firms.
The “first wave” fund supermarket model was underpinned by legacy systems and product
providers innovated by developing idiosyncratic standards with suppliers to connect components.
Competitive advantage derived from capabilities in product design and systems integration by
linking to a wide range of collective investment funds. The key driver for competitive advantage
was the ability to connect as many funds, and as many financial planning tools as possible, and
as quickly as possible but scale was crucial, you could use your scale to negotiate better contracts
with suppliers at better terms.
5.1.1 Changes in regulation
Announced in 2003 and implemented in 2006, the UK Government streamlined the existing complex range of pension regulations into a single set of rules. Pensions simplification did not aim
to directly regulate product design but rather created a single set of rules and standards within
which firms could innovate. The evolution to a single set of rules was seized upon by the product
providers7 and platform operators8 as an opportunity to aggressively market “pension consolidation.” In the race to persuade consumers to consolidate numerous legacy pension schemes into
a single product, the platform operators developed a modular pension (SIPP) that adhered to
the new simplification rules at speed and offered licensing arrangements to product providers in
the sector. In contrast, the legacy systems of product providers were unable to be re-architected,
and outsourcing to the platform operators now seemed the only viable solution, especially given
that speed to market was a strategic imperative. This fast-changing context increased the level
of competition in all layers of the IVC: Competition got stronger, we went from about six to
30 platforms. We saw a proliferation of new entrants who eventually dragged the incumbents to
change their models.
5.1.2 Changes in technological choices
During the early 2000s, technology firms in Australasia had previously executed the “platforming” of retail investment and pension products in their home market and recognized the
opportunities in the evolving UK landscape. Based upon their prior experience, and the emerging separability of the UK sector, the platform operators had developed a modular technical
architecture that encompassed multiple products (SIPP, ISA, and collective investment account)
and permitted an almost unlimited range of collective investment funds and complementary
components that connected to the platform technology via standards. The modular platform
7 In this paper, we refer to firms that offer pension products as “product providers.” These firms are authorized
by the FCA to conduct business in personal pensions. However, these firms are also authorized as platforms, and the
regulator also uses the term “platform service providers.” The industry, in contrast, rarely uses either of these terms
and often uses the shorthand of “platform” or “investment platform” to denote the product provider.
8 We use the term “platform operator” to denote the technology firms which license the platform technology to
the product providers.
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5.1.3 Emergence of strategic bottlenecks—platform operator layer
While the platform architecture had a high degree of modularity, there was already a realization
that if every product provider plugged into the same platform operator, the damaging economic
effects of the era of stakeholder pensions and the financial crises may be further worsened: It was
99% standard. Everybody added every component possible, but “plug and play” takes away
differentiation.
While outsourcing to the platform operators provided scale benefits, differentiation came at
a very high cost. The dilemma facing incumbent firms was that for simple regulatory change,
the cost of change was low. These platform operators had 15+ clients each, and so the cost
of change could be divided by 15. But, for innovations that provided differentiation that was
far more difficult. Another respondent elaborated: You bore the full development cost, and you
were in a queue. The platform operators were, at the time, basically technology firms with limited
capacity. You often had to wait ages to be prioritized, and the day rate costs for development
was simply eye-watering. And, given the contracting model was scale-based, if you couldn’t convince them the innovation would lead to exponential scale they wouldn’t play ball. The platform
operators were more interested in signing up new product providers than innovating with us.
It’s understandable, but it stifled our ability to innovate. The power balance had fundamentally
shifted to the platform operators: We were naturally interested in acquiring IP, whereas they
9 Unit-linked personal pension sales fell from 230,000 in 2005 to 135,000 in 2012. Stakeholder pensions doing
likewise, falling from 237,000 in 2005 to 180,000 in 2012 (FCA, 2019).
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architecture attracted product providers who needed a platform architecture to protect against the
churn of their legacy pension assets to competitors and new entrants. One respondent highlighted
that it costs us a lot of money to keep up with legislation, regulation, and product enhancements,
and it’s just not efficient anymore to make all of those changes in-house. We are not a specialist
technology provider. It makes much more sense for us to use the new platform because they’re
servicing multiple providers and so it is faster and cheaper. Another respondent summarized:
We wanted to be ready to take advantage of pensions simplification; to take advantage of the
maturing ISA market; and protect our legacy book with ultra-high margins. As a customer of the
platform, we could decide which bits we wanted to buy, and which we didn’t. Time was short,
capital was short, and we knew absolutely nothing about technology.
The technological disruption threw everything up in the air, and the IVC was separating into
distinctive and separable activities, specialization is definitely going on and there’s re-carving up
of the old value chain because as soon as you outsource your systems, you outsource control,
and you outsource the standards and components to link to those systems. But, it meant that we
could instantly access thousands of components. Our old proprietary system couldn’t do any of
that.
By the end of this period, with sales of SIPPs increasing exponentially—from just 427 in 2005
to 230,000 in 2012 and over 700,000 by 2014 (FCA, 2019)—the scale opportunity put downward pressure on margins resulting in a focus on building sales volume. The impact on production
margin is summed up by one respondent: Pensions were very profitable, but in came the platforms, not profitable anymore. You basically tried to hang on. We had more volume than other
people so we could squeeze the suppliers who had linked in harder; we could still make enough
money provided we could keep volumes up but it wasn’t like the game before. We thought …
stakeholder pensions was bad at 1% … it had now been chipped to 0.25% or less. You had to
win volume through pensions consolidation or try to work out a way to differentiate.
Legacy personal pension sales also started to collapse.9 At the same time the effects of the
financial crisis were also starting to bite. The market value of pension assets was eroded due to
stock market volatility, resulting in a reduction of product provider revenue flows from annual
charges. However, despite this volatility, the “platform” model was reaping rewards in terms of
scale for those early-mover product providers who had outsourced to platform operators around
2005. In addition, early movers who had switched their business model from a largely fixed cost
model to a variable cost model enjoyed a cost advantage and were growing market share, despite
a large number of new entrants.
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FINANCIAL MODELLING
(e.g., E-value)

STOCKBROKING
(e.g., HSBC)

Key capability: investment management

Key capability:
so ware, actuarial
modelling

Key capability:
share trading

DISCRETIONARY
FUND
MANAGMENT
(e.g., Brewin
Dolphin)
Key capability:
managing bespoke
investments

Typical share of IVC revenues: 35%

EXTERNAL CRM/
MI SYSTEMS
(e.g., Intellifo)

COMMERICAL
PROPERTY
(e.g., Suﬀolk Life)

INVESTMENT DATA
(e.g., Standards &
Poor)

Key capability:
aggrega ng data
for IFSs

Key capability:
property trading

Key capability: data
provision, analysis
and aggrega on

PRODUCT PROVIDERS

Key players: Standard Life, Aegon, Skandia (now Old Mutual), Aviva, Fidelity
Key capability: product design, systems integra on
Market share Top 3: 35% approx.
Top 3 Assets under administra on: around £230bn
Typical share of IVC revenues:30%

PLATFORM OPERATORS
Key players: FNZ, GBST, Bravura
Key capability: stakeholder management, product
management, investment management, banking,
payments in and out, cash management, valua ons,
fees and/or commissions, withdrawals, payroll,
accoun ng, reconcilia on, security, workﬂow, web
portal, customer servicing
Market share Top 3: 65% approx. market share
advised pla orms
(remainder largely held on legacy systems)
Top 3 Assets under administra on: around £320bn
Typical share of IVC revenues: 10%

DISTRIBUTORS (IFAS)
(e.g.,various SMEs)
Key capability: product/investment
advice
Typical share of IVC revenues: 25%

CONSUMERS
Self-employed and mass aﬄuent
consumers

NOTE: Key features of regulatory change from Figure 2 to Figure 3:
• 2006: Pensions simpliﬁca on = standardized product rules = driver for consolida on of legacy
pensions into one product
• 2012: Retail Distribu on Review = commissions banned between market counterpar es =
downward pressure on produc on margin in IFA ﬁrms, driver in IFA channel for bespoke products
to counteract downward pressure
• 2015: Pensions Act removed requirement to disinvest pension and buy an annuity = further driver
for consolida on plus enhanced produc on margin (due to minimized encashment risk at age 75)
Figure 3. Typical IVC structure (platform architecture c2005–2015)

were not interested in sharing it. On new innovations, we were limited to one year IP before it
reverted to them and it led to a general feeling of standardization, with the platform technology
firms reaping all the rewards.
By the end of this phase, the IVC of the platform architecture was structured as shown in
Figure 3:
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FUND MANAGEMENT GROUPS
(e.g., Fidelity, M&G, Jupiter, JP Morgan)
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5.2 The transition phase (2012–2015)

5.2.1 Emergence of strategic bottlenecks—distribution layer
Prior to RDR the cost of advice had been embedded implicitly in product charges. In other words,
IFA commissions were paid by the product provider from its product charges. RDR mandated
that the cost of advice had to be negotiated directly between the IFA firm and the client. It was
anticipated that many customers would be unwilling to pay for explicit up-front financial advice,
at the levels previously embedded, and many IFA firms would either exit the market or implement
more efficient business models. IFA firms had to adopt a new business model to survive.
Those IFA firms which wished to stay in the market had two aims: to lobby product providers
for differentiated products that consumers would be willing to pay for, while at the same time,
lower compliance risk associated with giving investment advice. For example, advisors have
compliance challenges and also need to be more efficient, a lot of advisors wanted a packaged
proposition, where the compliance risks of asset allocation and fund selection was effectively outsourced to the product provider. Bundling, efficiency, and risk management went hand-in-hand
after RDR. Consequently, IFA firms began horizontally consolidating with other IFA firms to
acquire scale and exert influence over product providers. As one respondent recalled: The bundled propositions IFA firms demanded could be white-labelled by the IFA firm so they appeared
to be designed by the IFA. With IFA firms investing hugely in CRM systems, suddenly the IFAs
were no longer reliant on being “fed” commission by product providers and instead the balance
10 Skandia (now Old Mutual), CoFunds, Fidelity, and Transact held about 45% market share.
11 An example: Firm A could offer its pension product at a product charge 0.5% pa and promise to “pass-on” all
rebates from fund management firms (typically 0.75%) to the customer. Firm B offers its pension at say 0% pa product
charge, and the product provider keep the rebates. In the example, Firm A has the cheaper product and yet it appears
to the customer as if Firm B does. RDR banned this type of commission between firms so firms had to compete more
transparently.
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By 2012, assets held on platforms had grown to c£150bn and sales of SIPPs had increased to
230,000 (FCA, 2019). New entrants had swelled the number of product providers licensing the
platform technology to 23 (FCA, 2018; The Lang Cat, 2020). Advised new business flows were
now approximately 70% onto platforms (The Platforum, 2015; The Lang Cat, 2020). The firstwave “fund supermarket” product providers who had since outsourced to the platform operators
remained dominant.10 However, other early-mover incumbents such as Standard Life had grown
market share (The Lang Cat, 2020).
From 2012, the modularity of the pension product started to reconfigure. Announced in 2006,
the 2012 Retail Distribution Review (RDR; see FCA, 2014a) implemented further regulatory
change. One key dimension included making commissions, between market counterparties, illegal. In practical terms, the market was perceived by the FCA as dysfunctional, firstly because
product providers could compete with each other on the basis of the level of commission paid
to IFA firms (and in turn this often resulted in higher customer charges) and secondly as product
providers could “mask” the level of product charges by negotiating “cash rebates” (commissions)
with fund management firms based upon scale; the higher the scale, the higher the rebate.11 As
one respondent summed up: Typically, we were getting on average about 0.75% cash rebate from
the fund managers – obviously it depended upon the fund – and with that income we could then
keep the product price as low as c0.25%. So, we received about 1% in total as a typical revenue
model. RDR came along and banned cash rebates. But, nobody dared put the product charge up
above 0.5%. So, our revenue model halved more or less. It became impossible to survive unless
you could get scale, differentiate or start taking manufacturing margin from elsewhere.
The implications were felt along the entire IVC with product providers under increasing
pressure to differentiate in the face of diminishing margins. Most product providers became
concerned: How do you add value back? Margins get squeezed so tight, that somebody in the
value-chain’s got to do something different because there’s a footrace to the floor. The critical
strategic question became which components to insource and which to outsource: If you think
that a particular component is where you get the majority of your margin, this will influence
whether you insource or outsource. Companies that have investment capability are naturally
going to insource that. Obviously, if you have software capability, you might insource that.

1070

N. Burton and P. Galvin

of power has shifted. Product providers couldn’t compete on levels of commission, and instead
had to cater to the demands of intermediaries.
Following RDR, two transitional approaches to product reconfiguration emerged, namely
modularity with guidance, which focused on bundling and formal and relational contracts, which
were known by industry insiders as “power blocks.”

5.2.3 Formal and relational contracts
Whereas modularity with guidance was an attempt to differentiate using existing capabilities in
fund management and use bundling and marketing to “guide” customers toward investments
with higher production margin, the emergence of new IVC configurations, which respondents
called power blocks, represented a different transitional approach to less modularity. Power
blocks comprised a product provider acting as a “systems integrator,” bringing together various
industry actors, such as the platform operator, one or more significant IFA firms, a few fund
management groups, one or more financial modeling software providers, and possibly other
IVC participants, to create a unique product for that particular value chain configuration. For
example, We created at least six power block configurations. Based upon customer segmentation
models, we had what we called the discretionary advice configuration. We invited three of the
big IFA firms who advised those kinds of clients [high net-worth individuals], and we invited
in their panel of discretionary fund managers. We collaborated and agreed what the proposition would encompass, we also discussed bespoke customer servicing, data-sharing between us,
and ultimately how revenue would be shared. As part of these power blocks, the actors would
be restricted from providing the same component or technology to other power block configurations or other firms. The actors of the power block created unique components that were
non-transferable to other settings, despite the systemic modularity of the platform architecture.
The power blocks were governed through closer, multilateral relational contracts. These
arrangements couldn’t involve arms-length contracts because we needed to work together closely
in the design of the proposition, but also once it had been offered to the market we needed
real-time information-sharing and cooperation to manage it over time. Often, we co-located
people together during design to ensure the proposition worked effectively. The contracts also
needed to specify how investment costs and resources would be shared, we all contributed capital, as well as how revenues would be divided. We had to agree on how the pie was shared
between us. The result is a degree of integration in respect of product design. Firms are not
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5.2.2 Modularity with guidance
In response to demand in the IFA market, bundling was also attractive to product providers
who moved to embed bundled products because, they had a vested interest in having their own
in-house funds with manufacturing margin at the heart of the bundle. They were under severe
pressure to make money in a commoditized world. The only significant margin was in investment
management and so many product providers embraced bundling very quickly.
Bundling was perceived by many respondents as a potential source of differentiation based
upon internalized capabilities in fund management. Product providers collaborated more closely
with their own fund management divisions to create unique bundles of investment options. For
instance, a respondent recalled: Where can we make extra margin? We made bundles with our
own extra special funds, called our elite range. A further respondent commented: We did guided
architecture, the “guiding” remains within the framework of the modular architecture, but you’re
seeing a big narrowing down now, and providing an extra guided step.
However, it was acknowledged that this may not be an effective long-term solution to differentiation. One respondent highlighted: I think it quickly became quite clear that bundling modular
components was not going to gear-shift margin. It certainly helped, but the shift needed was in
the way you could integrate a whole range of components as unique for the client and the IFA.
This meant making the funds interdependent with other components. So, you created a bundle
of investment funds that the IFA chooses, you linked it all to financial modelling tools, bespoke
customer service, client reports, and allowed the IFA to co-brand.
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vertically integrated, but utilize formal and relational contracts that have closer multilateral ties
to coordinate innovation.

5.3 The shift toward less modularity (2015–2020)

12 It is worth noting that prior to pensions simplification in 2006 it was a requirement to buy an annuity upon
retirement. In 2006, this was changed to “at age 75,” and the SIPP product developed by the platform operators in
2006 had a feature known as “income drawdown.” With many consumers between 2006 and 2015 still choosing to
purchase an annuity, this feature was rarely utilized. The Pensions Act then removed this requirement to buy an annuity
completely. Furthermore, as annuity rates have consistently fell over time due to increased life expectancy, lower interest
rate expectations, improving health, etc., income drawdown has grown in popularity. As the profitability of pensions
is very sensitive to the duration that the product is held (as fees are charged on a per year basis), this regulatory change
substantially increased the notional profitability of SIPPs with an income drawdown feature.
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By 2015, despite the RDR still creating significant disruption in the IVC, the value of assets held
on platforms had nonetheless increased to £239.3bn, with new entrants escalating to 30. Sales
of SIPPs continued to increase, reaching 700,000 by 2015 and nearly 1 million by 2018. Market
shares held by the top players remained largely unchanged, although market concentration of
the top four slightly reduced (FCA, 2018).
New regulations, which continued to favor consolidation of legacy pensions into SIPP products and hence onto platforms, came into force via the Pensions Act, 2015. With around 60%
of legacy pensions assets held in the “de-accumulation” phase, the Pensions Act withdrew the
requirement to buy an annuity at age 75, meaning that pensions could remain invested until death
and drawn down to provide a retirement income.12 This change also opened up the significant
opportunities for defined benefit pensions (occupational pensions) to be switched to a personal
SIPP at retirement and drawn down while continuing to be invested. This announcement by the
Government came with no forewarning or prior consultation.
While pensions simplification in 2006 had relaxed the capital adequacy requirement for SIPP
product providers and encouraged several new entrants, the financial crises had caused regulators
in the EU to revisit the capital adequacy requirements of many financial institutions. Although
the initial focus was on the banking sector, by 2015 the FCA had grown concerned about the
capital adequacy of SIPP product providers, and capital adequacy was significantly strengthened
(FCA, 2014b). The requirement to hold additional capital weakened the profitability of product
providers, further emphasizing the need to secure production margin from other IVC layers. As
one respondent summed up: Taking back manufacturing margin was key. Some purchased share
trade platforms. Others, discretionary management firms.
Many IFAs had also recognized that, in a post-RDR world, they would only survive if they
could be more efficient by consolidating all their clients onto one or two preferred platforms in
order to reduce costs and leverage power for a larger slice of IVC surplus. IFAs began creating
panels of platforms, often consisting of a “low-cost” platform for mass market customers and a
further platform with a key marker of differentiation that would appeal to their wealthier clients.
Product providers also recognized that massive scale was crucial to survival, and being selected
by IFA firms as one of the platforms on their panel was a strategic imperative.
The need for product providers to differentiate to appeal to the (re)platforming wave in the IFA
market was compelling and urgent. Modularity with guidance and power blocks had delivered
some success in driving up sales and production margin, however with the Pensions Act signaling
a second wave of “pensions consolidation” and IFA firms actively consolidating all existing clients
onto one or two platforms, the risks of potential shake-out were non-trivial. With the need to
recapture value also clear, product providers began re-assessing which components to (re)insource
and which to continue to outsource. According to one respondent: We recognized that IFA firms
were platforming based upon key areas of differentiation that suited their client base. We knew
IFAs wanted one or two platforms that had distinctive features and capabilities. The trouble
was in the last decade we had outsourced most things with arms’ length contracts. Another
remarked: We needed to bring back in house many of the high-value components that offered us
differentiation.
Less product modularity and less industry specialization were driven by horizontal and vertical
(re)integration. To secure scale, horizontal consolidation was occurring at all levels of the IVC.
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For example, in fund management bigger groups were gobbling up newer fund groups to bring
their expertise in to widen their own product set. In the IFA layer, consolidation was also evident
because at the advisor level, IFA consolidators came in, and, so, the advice-side became much
less fragmented. The big consolidators knew they needed to leverage power over the product
providers to stand a chance.
In the product provider layer, horizontal integration was also occurring, but to less an extent
because Many of the platforms are not that profitable, but withdraw from the market or sell
out and you not only lose the new business, but more importantly, you probably lose the huge
existing pension book you have because IFAs will not leave their existing customers invested in a
product provider who is closed. Nonetheless, horizontal integration occurred and a few big deals
were sealed as medium-sized platforms merged to get scale or capability and try to compete with
the leaders.
Forward and backward vertical integration became more prevalent across the IVC from 2012,
but accelerated after 2015. For example, product providers started to purchase IFA firms which
were profitable, and so we bought an advisor firm. So we now have our own advice capability
in house, which we’ve now fully integrated and rebranded. The logic was summarized as a mustdo. IFA firms were the keys to the door. That is the customer. Most IFA firms have re-platformed
by switching all their clients onto one or two platforms, and you just can’t be locked out. The
potential damage is just too painful.
Product providers were also backward integrating into upstream component firms to develop
potential focal areas of differentiation, for example, we bought a stockbroking business or we
bought a portfolio software company to give us aggregated reporting and portfolio construction,
which is much richer than the standard platforms can do. One respondent summarized: Look,
you need to decide how you are going to compete. One of our competitors decided it was financial modelling, they bought software suppliers. For us, its discretionary fund management, so we
bought probably the world’s largest and most prestigious discretionary manager. Some product
provider firms, however, vertically integrated both upstream and downstream, We recognized
that we needed to buy distribution to avoid lock-out, but we also wanted a few distinctive areas
of differentiation, and while we already had our own fund management arm, we also took equity
stakes in a whole host of firms such as software, commercial property, discretionary fund management, and so on. We had to get back control and use our power to start leading the market
the way we wanted to.
By the end of this period, the IVC had reconfigured to less specialization, as shown in Figure 4.
By now, 43 platforms held nearly £500bn of assets and accounted for over 80% of advised
new business and around 70% of pension assets (The Lang Cat, 2020). Despite the growth
in the number of platforms, the market shares of the first- and second-wave early movers had
held firm: Skandia (now Old Mutual), Fidelity, and Transact still accounted for about 25% of
pension assets. However, three of the large incumbents of the 1990s, including Standard Life
and Aegon had leading market share positions, accounting for about 35%. Many of the new
entrants had gained little traction with market shares of between 1 and 4%. SIPP sales remained
the dominant way to purchase a personal pension with nearly a million new SIPPs, while legacy
personal pension sales continued to fall (FCA, 2019).
Our extended discussion next is structured as follows: (1) we discuss the shift toward more
modularity and specialization between 2005 and 2012, in which we highlight the role of
regulation; (2) we show how strategic bottlenecks subsequently developed in the platform technology and distribution layers of the IVC; (3) we then illuminate how product providers firms
responded to these bottlenecks through integrative innovation by developing “power blocks”—a
quasi-ecosystem of firms to develop product configurations with less product modularity; and,
(4) from 2015, given the mixed success of integrative innovation, we show how product provider
firms pursued vertical (re)integration of both downstream and upstream components firms to
further mitigate the power and control of the platform technology bottleneck. We complete our
discussion with some concluding remarks and opportunities for further research.
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FINANCIAL MODELLING
(e.g., E-value)

STOCKBROKING
(e.g., HSBC)

Key capability: investment management

Key capability:
so ware, actuarial
modelling

Key capability:
share trading

DISCRETIONARY
FUND
MANAGMENT
(e.g., Brewin
Dolphin)
Key capability:
managing bespoke
investments

Typical share of IVC revenues: 35%

EXTERNAL CRM/
MI SYSTEMS
(e.g., Intellifo)

COMMERICAL
PROPERTY
(e.g., Suﬀolk Life)

INVESTMENT DATA
(e.g., Standards &
Poor)

Key capability:
aggrega ng data
for IFSs

Key capability:
property trading

Key capability: data
provision, analysis
and aggrega on

PRODUCT PROVIDERS

Key players: Standard Life, Aegon, Skandia (now Old Mutual), Aviva, Fidelity
Key capability: product design and development, systems integra on
Market share Top 3: 35% approx.
Top 3 Assets under administra on: around £275bn
Typical share of IVC revenues:30%

PLATFORM OPERATORS
Key players: FNZ, GBST, Bravura
Key capability: stakeholder management, product
management, investment management, banking,
payments in and out, cash management, valua ons,
fees and/or commissions, withdrawals, payroll,
accoun ng, reconcilia on, security, workﬂow, web
portal, customer servicing
Market share Top 3: 65% approx. market share
advised pla orms
(remainder largely held on legacy systems)
Top 3 Assets under administra on: around £650bn
Typical share of IVC revenues: 10%

DISTRIBUTORS (IFAS)
(e.g., mix of consolidated/small ﬁrms)
Key capability: product/investment
advice
Typical share of IVC revenues: 25%

CONSUMERS
Self-employed and mass aﬄuent
consumers

Denotes typical (re)integra on
pa ern, high-value components
Figure 4. Typical IVC reintegration 2020

6. Discussion
We looked for evidence of the mechanisms associated with shifts to more or less product modularity and whether there was a corresponding shift toward more or less specialization. By doing
so, we offer four contributions to the existing literature on product and industry co-evolution
in the context of a regulated sector. We foreground the importance of the interplay between the
strategic choices of firms and the exogenous agendas of regulators and policy.
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FUND MANAGEMENT GROUPS
(e.g., Fidelity, M&G, Jupiter, JP Morgan)

1074

N. Burton and P. Galvin

6.1 The shift toward more modularity and specialization
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Extant literature has primarily explained shifts toward increasing modularity through technological change and product development processes (e.g., Ulrich, 1995; Schilling, 2000) and through
the changing architecture of inter-organizational relationships (Brusoni et al., 2001; Cabigiosu
and Camuffo, 2012; Tee, 2019) and the emergence and adoption of formal and informal standards (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995; Garud et al., 2002). Our first contribution is to take
an institutional, sector-wide lens and to show how shifts in regulation policy re-set the rules of
the game and pushed the industry toward more modular product configurations and greater firm
specialization between 2005 and 2012. The step change occurred in anticipation of, and following, pensions simplification regulations, as the legacy systems of product provider firms were
unable to be re-architected to take advantage of market opportunities that favored modularity.
Spurred on by pensions simplification, the SIPP product became embedded as the modular dominant design as regulations encouraged unbundling, which attracted platform technologies and a
vast array of component firms into the sector.
In anticipation of pensions consolidation set for April 2006, a number of platform operators with modular technical architectures and with marked similarities to a supply chain
platform described by Gawer (2014) had entered the sector with a platform technology that
could accommodate modular product families and attend to the anticipated heterogeneity in
demand as consumers consolidated the legacy pensions they held. Product providers were
able to license the platform technology in a way that it could be tailored to their strategic aims based upon tens of thousands of different module combinations (The Lang Cat,
2019). Following an earlier role in the “platforming” of investment markets in Australia, the
platform operators had recognized that the existing UK fund supermarket model already had
an emerging separability (see also Jacobide and Kudina, 2013; Burton et al., 2020) and that the
regulator had corresponding objectives around competition and innovation, and together these
factors enabled them to quickly leverage an architectural advantage.
Despite the regulators’ aims to promote competition and innovation, however, many incumbent firms were slow to react as they believed product modularity and narrowing of vertical
scope would ultimately hurt them. As such, early moves to the modular platform technology
were initially perceived as only creating option value (Baldwin and Clark, 2003), and firms
talked about a “last man standing” strategy relating to their existing products. New entrants,
conversely, were greatly attracted to the modular platform technology and saw its adoption as
an opportunity to acquire a significant position in market and leverage rents from the pensions
consolidation wave. Once the lead incumbent firm, however, announced a licensing agreement
with a platform operator in 2005 (Standard Life licensing the FNZ platform technology), other
incumbent product provider firms were quickly forced to exercise their option and judged that
the SIPP would fulfill the varied needs of different market segment and millions of consumers,
while offering them opportunities to capture value from pensions consolidation and mitigate the
risk of existing pension assets and corresponding rents being “churned” to competitor firms.
These dynamics initiated a subsequent wave of modularization and specialization that spanned
the period 2005–2008. This wave attracted over 30 new entrants and quickly displaced legacy
business models.
This disruption has much in common with Jacobides (2005) case study of the US mortgage
banking sector. However, whereas in the US mortgage banking sector, the shift toward more
specialization was driven endogenously, our case analysis points toward a more active role of
regulation that subsequently shaped firm responses. With mis-selling scandals still fresh in the
consciousness of the regulator and with policy aims to widen consumer choice, curb excessive price discrimination, and reduce complexity through unbundling, the regulators interest in
“architectural regulation” (Wishnick, 2020) had reshaped the sector toward greater modularity
and specialization, and, given the urgency of the 2006 simplification deadline, incumbent firms
were forced to quickly follow, or potentially be selected out.
Following the shift toward greater modularity and specialization, our second contribution
relates to how modularity and specialization in regulated sectors can lead to the emergence
of strategic bottlenecks. While incumbent product providers recognized an opportunity to

co-evolution of product and industry architecture

1075

13 For example, FNZ are reported to have c£300bn assets and was recently acquired by investment management
firms CPDQ and Generation for £1.65bn (Insider, 2018) who then completed an acquisition of rival GBST in 2019.
However, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has recently demanded FNZ sell GBST due to concerns
over market concentration risks (CMA, 2020).
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create value through modular product families, increased component variety, speed to market (Sanchez and Collins, 2001), and competition based on superior marketing and branding
(e.g., West, 2003; Hobday et al., 2005), they ultimately failed to capture value in the reconfigured
specialized ecosystem. Instead, the shift toward greater product modularity and specialization
failed to deliver the anticipated economic benefits. Existing research has indicated several contexts in which there are challenges and limits to capturing value in modular markets (Chesbrough
and Kusunoki, 2001) related to complexity in innovation (Brusoni et al., 2007; Rivkin, 2000),
competency traps (Zirpoli and Becker, 2011), and commoditization (Pil and Cohen, 2006).
Our case analysis, however, enables us to shift the analysis to the industry level and reassert
that different industry architectures embody different appropriation characteristics (Pisano and
Teece, 2007). The shift to a modular platform architecture and corresponding specialization
had resulted in value migrating away from product providers to two bottleneck positions that
emerged in the IVC: (1) from 2008 to the platform operators who held architectural control
and intellectual property (IP) of the technology and (2) from 2012 to IFA firms who acted as
a gatekeeper and controlled access to distribution and the customer experience (e.g., Baldwin,
2015, 2020; Jacobides and Tae, 2015; Hannah and Eisenhardt, 2018).
The first strategic bottleneck occurred in the platform operator layer, and by 2008 most product providers had outsourced technology to the platform operators. The reconfiguration of firm
boundaries to a narrower scope, however, left many product providers with an integrator role
but few technological capabilities in either the architecture or component layer, a limited span
of control, and little or no formal IP. Most had outsourced architectural IP to the platform operators and component IP to component firms, opening a Pandora’s Box that allowed others to
claim a significant proportion of the value (Henkel et al., 2013).
The platform operators managed to develop and occupy a bottleneck position by controlling
the modularity of the platform architecture and licensing the technology to multiple product
provider firms, thereby encouraging competition and severely weakening their appropriability
(Adner and Kapoor, 2016). While the product providers continued to act as integrators and
shaped the corresponding contracts with component firms, the platform operators controlled the
technology and acted as a gatekeeper for the pace and speed of component innovation. In prior
work, Baldwin (2015: 10) noted that strategic bottlenecks are “part of a technical system that
has no – or very poor – alternatives,” and firms wishing to capture value need to carefully manage strategic bottlenecks in an IVC. In our case, product providers had no viable technological
alternatives, limited architectural or component-level capabilities or IP. However, while Baldwin
(2015) noted that strategic bottlenecks are not cast in stone and industry architectures can change
dramatically over time (Pisano and Teece, 2007), our case analysis reveals that the platform operators managed to occupy this position through developing a modular platform architecture that
paralleled the regulators’ aims and by controlling innovation and the modularity of the architecture. While competition is inevitably fierce in the platform operator layer of the IVC and firms in
this layer are subject to close regulatory scrutiny, this serves to limit the bottleneck power they
could otherwise yield. Only three firms dominate this layer.13 As a result, the platform operators have grown powerful over time, despite having limited (or nil) visibility to end customers
(Jacobides et al., 2018).
Our findings also enable us to highlight the role of regulation in the emergence of the technology bottleneck. Prior to the regulators’ interest in promoting competition and innovation,
product providers had occupied a sole position as systemically important institutions, the failure
of which could lead to systemic risk. Since the platform operators had entered the sector and
acquired positional and architectural power, the regulator recognized these firms as also being
systemically important and sought to maintain a balance in the degree to which the platform
operators could wield power arising from their relative position. On the one hand, the emergence of the platform operators as a bottleneck begs the question: Why not acquire the platform
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6.2 Transition period: integrative innovation and relational governance
In response to the emergence of both upstream (technology) and downstream (distribution)
strategic bottlenecks, our third contribution relates to how product providers responded. Our
findings highlight that most product providers initially responded by pursuing two types of “integrative innovation” (Fixson and Park, 2008) during a transition phase between 2012 and 2015,
albeit with mixed success.
The first type of integrative innovation—modularity with guidance—saw product providers
use the modularity of the platform technology to develop self-preferencing component bundles
with a proprietary investment component (such as an investment fund) at its heart. These had
14 Competition and Markets Authority (https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-and-marketsauthority).
15 For instance, the CMA blocked a merger between two of the three platform operators (https://www.gov.uk/cmacases/fnz-gbst-merger-inquiry).
16 FCA report (2019): https://www.fca.org.uk/data/retail-intermediary-market-2019.
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operator? While the platform operators were initially technology start-up firms, multiple firms
in the product provider layer were licensing the platform technologies from just three operators, and vertical integration of the platform operator was perceived as unattractive and likely to
attract regulatory and CMA14 scrutiny. Furthermore, product providers recognized that if they
wished to acquire the platform operator it was highly probable, if not certain, that competitor
product provider firms would re-platform their assets—and associated rents—to a rival platform
operator thereby reducing the attractiveness of the acquisitive target. On the other hand, the
power wielded by the platform operators was also constrained by the regulators. The regulator
and CMA had concerns that limiting competition in the platform technology layer may lead to
a less resilient and less robust market structure. Moreover, while the FCA (2017) noted that
vertical integration can sometimes create market efficiencies, it also needed to eliminate conflicts
of interest and systemic risk. Thus, this limited opportunities for platform operators to forward
integrate into product provision, as well as their ability to consolidate horizontally.15
The second strategic bottleneck emerged around 2012 in the distribution layer of the IVC,
providing a second example of how regulation can encourage strategic bottlenecks. However,
prior to 2012 (the implementation of the RDR), IFA commission were bundled as an integral
part of the product price. As such, product providers could compete based upon the level of
initial commission paid to IFA firms (a feature of the industry which benefited incumbent firms
with access to significant capital). RDR regulations mandated unbundling and IFA firms were
faced with negotiating fees directly with consumers. The RDR, therefore, can be interpreted as
further regulation that continued to unbundle the product architecture, and as a consequence the
regulator expected price discrimination to lower prices for the benefit of consumers. Furthermore,
the dense inter-firm ties between product providers and IFA firms (based upon non-disclosed
commission) were also dismantled as IFA firms were expected to ensure “best” whole of market
advice.
While the number of IFA firms and the fees they could negotiate were expected to reduce
once they became transparent to the customer (The Guardian, 2012), RDR also had the effect of
shifting ownership of the customer experience away from the product provider to IFA firms who
now acted as a gatekeeper. The IFA firms who survived this shake-out (often those with access to
capital and/or deep customer relationships) demanded differentiated or bespoke products from
product providers which consumers would be willing to pay substantial fees for. At the same
time, given the fragmented nature of the UK financial advice sector,16 the IFA market attracted
substantial private equity and IFA consolidator firms that drove horizontal consolidation
(FT Adviser, 2019), which enables these powerful distribution firms to exert significant power
and influence over product providers for bespoke products. As a consequence of these dynamics,
rather than IFA fees falling, a rising share of the IVC surplus ensued. Given that customers could
primarily be accessed only through IFA firms, product providers were at high risk of lock-out if
IFA firm demands were unmet, and the increasing power and size of the IFA firms presented a
significant bottleneck.
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6.3 The shift toward less modularity and specialization
The power blocks had mixed success and eventually gave way to vertical (re)integration. As
Colfer and Baldwin (2016) enquired, instead of relational contracting, “why not unite the actors
within the boundaries of a single firm?”. Our fourth contribution relates to a reintegration
phase between 2015 and 2020 and shows how further broadening vertical scope through vertical
(re)integration of component firms can be a way to minimize or null the effects of firms occupying
a bottleneck. While integrative innovation had delivered some success in driving up margin, there
remained risks of exappropriation and the economic risks of the bottlenecks remained significant.
Moreover, further pensions regulation triggered by the Pensions Act, 2015, which removed the
legal requirement to cash-in a pension at age 75 to purchase an annuity, signaled a second wave
of pensions consolidation that would further shake-out the sector.
While Hannah and Eisenhardt (2018) have remarked that innovating upstream from a bottleneck is likely unviable (Adner and Kapoor, 2016), our case analysis suggests that doing so can be
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higher production margin so as to make the entire component bundle more profitable, but also
less portable (Burton and Galvin, 2020). In addition, product providers used the component
bundles to exert pressure on upstream component firms who wished to be part of the bundle in
order to secure preferential contracting terms. Consequently, the product provider bundled the
components together by virtue of the way they were priced and/or marketed to smaller IFA firms
which lacked the power to fully leverage their emergent bottleneck position. This corresponds
with West’s (2003) suggestion that marketing and branding may offer the only opportunity to
capture value in open markets. Beyond 2015, however, the regulators’ concerns about open
competition fueled it to view guided modularity as potentially anti-competitive that resulted in
further regulatory guidance that resulted in this type of “re-bundling” difficult without attracting
regulatory scrutiny.
The second type of “integrative innovation” that we theorize from our data is the emergence
of formal and relational contracts, which participants referred to as power blocks. This is similar
to the idea of ecosystems (Jacobides et al., 2018) that coalesce around a particular innovation.
In our case, power blocks refer to a formalized IVC configuration, whereby the product provider
acted as a lead firm and sought to coalesce a group of trustworthy firms in each layer of the
IVC and who each held strong market positions to develop differentiated modular component
configurations that were perceived as opportunities for value creation. At the product component level, each component governed through the power block configuration was differentiated
on some performance criteria and made less portable or re-usable through re-architecting the
component design. As components in the bundle became more specific to each other, functioning
together in idiosyncratic ways, they also became less portable and re-usable outside the power
block, fundamentally changing their coupling characteristics. Thus, our conception of power
blocks highlights that when product components and the interfaces between them become more
tacit, the governance arrangements become richer and more relational.
The power blocks entailed formalized governance, including co-location, suggesting that firms
substitute weak organizational ties such as arms’ length market contracts with stronger ties and
fewer players to pursue profitability (Chesbrough and Prencipe, 2008). Furthermore, the quasivertical integration in the power block served to establish parameters for how value capture was
divided, but also for how development costs and IP would be shared. The power blocks also
acted as a mechanism for product providers to mitigate the effects of the bottlenecks through
widening their span of control. Whereas existing research has suggested splitting a bottleneck into
modules or reintegrating bottlenecks as possible strategies to mitigate or null their effects (Adner
and Kapoor, 2010; Baldwin, 2015), our case points toward a further possibility—establishing
quasi-vertical scope configurations that enmesh the bottlenecks in relational governance modes
that encourage the bottleneck to cede (some) control over its operation and/or its ability to be
exercised. Moreover, the power blocks show that, while regulators’ determine the rules of the
game, there remains ample scope for firms to execute strategic choices that reimagine the product
and industry architecture in a way that serves their own ends.
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17 Example: Standard Life buying IFA Firm Pearson Jones for £9 m in 2015 and rebranding it as Standard Life
1825. 1825 has since acquired a number of other IFA businesses (e.g., FT Adviser, 2015).
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a viable strategy, especially in regulated markets where the technology bottleneck (platform operators) is a well-capitalized, systemically important firm and attempts to acquire the bottleneck
would attract regulator and CMA scrutiny. Product providers primarily pursued a strategy of
forward and backward vertical integration of both upstream component firms and downstream
IFA firms. Participants recounted numerous examples of product providers acquiring component firms, such as investment management firms, share trading platforms, and discretionary
fund management firms to secure component IP and differentiate their products in response to
the continued consolidation wave. In addition, product providers acquired IFA firms to mitigate
the effects of the strategic bottleneck in distribution and avoid potential lock-out. As IFA firms
were often less capitalized than product provider firms, there are many examples of acquisitive
activity in this layer of the IVC.17
While the regulator sought to encourage competition and innovation in the sector through
regulatory action that encouraged greater modularity, the endogenous responses of the platform operators eventually resulted in innovation being stifled through their determination of
who could license the platform and the type of component innovations developed, by who and
when. In other words, they acted as a gatekeeper to the innovation process and scheduled the
flow of component innovations to their own advantage. Furthermore, product providers were
expected to share component innovation IP with the platform operator who, in turn, licensed the
component technology to competitor firms after an agreed time period had elapsed exacerbating
concerns over imitation and exappropriation (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Baldwin and Henkel,
2015). While the power blocks had acted to quicken the speed and pace of component innovation
by encouraging the platform operator to prioritize component development of the power blocks,
product providers continued to suffer from concerns of distributed component IP.
Product providers perceived that component innovation could only be accelerated and exappropriation threats nulled by pursuing component (re)integration and pushing at the boundaries
of the rules in which they were playing. As a consequence, through vertical (re)integration of
component firms, product provider firms were able to innovate more successfully within component boundaries, so long as the standards connectivity to the platform architecture was stable.
Product provider firms in effect overcame the significant effects of the bottlenecks by widening their span of ownership and control (Baldwin, 2015). Overall, these findings suggest that
while greater modularity, influenced by regulatory change, can initially encourage architectural
and fast-paced component innovation (Galvin and Rice, 2008; Habib et al., 2020), strategic
bottlenecks can emerge in modular markets. Moreover, when the bottleneck is occupied by
a firm with architectural advantage, this can create a deficit in the speed and pace of component innovation as bottleneck firms leverage their architectural power to their own advantage.
The strategic responses by product provider firms suggest that the fast-paced innovation cycles
that are a feature of modularity may be a temporary phenomenon that is eventually eroded
through competitive dynamics. Our context, shaped by complexity and the dynamism of a
changing regulatory landscape, suggests that product providers recognized that only through
broadening their innovation search beyond the existing modular “rules of the game” could they
innovate to secure a differentiated position in the market. Whereas other scholars such as Brusoni
et al. (2007) and Ethira et al. (2008) have questioned the relationship between modularity and
innovation, we also highlight that speed, pace, and newness of component innovation can be
stifled in modular product systems when the bottleneck is occupied by a firm with architectural
advantage.
The dynamics of regulation and the shifts toward and away from greater modularity and specialization are summarized in Figure 5. While recognizably complex, the UK pensions sector is
marked by the imprint of the regulators’ agenda to promote competition and innovation in order
to improve consumer outcomes in a way that corresponds to the concerns of modularity advocates. The implementation of these aims through a series of major regulatory shifts encouraged
greater modularity and resulted in the vertical disintegration of the sector. Further simplification regulations and the evolving separability of the sector attracted platform technology firms
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Trajectory towards less modularity and specialization (2) (Vertical (re)integration)

Key regulation

Sector –supply heterogeneity
(Less specialization)

Promoting competition and innovation –
corresponding to concerns of modularity
advocates
Supply-side
(1)

Retail Distribution Review – further
encouraged unbundling

Demand-side
(1)

Component technologies bundled
into sub-systems and made less
portable

Superseded by

Pensions Act further encourages
pensions consolidation

Trajectory towards less modularity and specialization (1) (Integrative innovation)

Modularity with guidance

Power blocks

Re-bundling modular
components with selfpreferencing to leverage additional
rents

Ecosystems governed with
relational contracts and shared IP;
Less portable, less modular products

Effects on product provider firms

Emergence of strategic bottlenecks
Upstream bottleneck: Platform
operators

Regulatory dynamics influenced:

Downstream bottleneck:
Distribution

Significant new entrants and competition
Acquired architectural advantage
Severe pressure on rents due to high imitability

Demanded differentiated and
bespoke products

Controlling IP
Loss of architectural control to platform operators

Consumer gatekeeper
Innovation gatekeeper

Loss of architectural and component IP

Horizontal integration drives
distributor power and scale

Trajectory towards increasing modularity and specialization
Key regulation
Promotion competition and innovation –
corresponding to concerns of modularity
advocates.
Supply-side
•
•

Unbundling and price discrimination
Standards

Demand-side
•
•
•

Sector

Products

Partial seperability of sector had already
emerged between mid-1980s and 2005

Modular pension becomes dominant
design

Platform operators and component firms
enter the sector

SIPP, ISA and investments held on
modular multi-product platforms

Product providers forced to outsource to
platform operators and adopt modularity
as existing systems and products cannot be
re-architected

Pensions consolidation
Consumer outcomes
Variety

Figure 5. Regulation and industry change: process model

who managed to quickly gain architectural control and occupy a bottleneck position. Further
regulation that encouraged unbundling and created a second bottleneck in distribution further
exacerbated competitive dynamics for product provider firms. With vertical (re)integration of
the technology bottleneck commercially risky and likely to attract regulator scrutiny, product
provider firms reacted by widening their span of control through integrative innovation with
mixed results and later through acquiring component firms and using the modularity of the platform architecture to accelerate component innovation and occupy a differentiated position in the
market.
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Vertical reintegration of (1)
component firms to accelerate
component innovation and secure
component IP; and, (2) distribution
firms to envelop downstream
bottleneck

Sector – technology dynamics (Less
modularity)
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7. Conclusion
Our study has focused on the dynamic interplay between regulatory philosophy and the strategic
responses by firms in the UK personal pensions industry and how this impacted the co-evolution
of product and industry architecture. Our findings show that regulation has had a distinctive
influence on two phases: more modularity (2005–2012) and less modularity (2015–2020), with
a transition phase in-between (2012–2015).
Spurred on by pro-modularity regulation bias, we found that product modularization and the
specialization of the sector lead to the emergence of strategic bottlenecks in an IVC. Our case
analysis illustrates that faced with a loss of architectural control and constrained component
innovation, product providers initially pursued integrative innovation by rebundling modular
components and supporting these with marketing and branding, as well as through reconfiguring
the level of product modularity by switching to formal and relational contracts in power block
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We turn to our final remarks. Given regulatory change and the subsequent strategic responses
by firms have fundamentally changed competitive dynamics, it continues to be dominated by
those product provider firms that were vertically integrated incumbents in the 1990s or those
innovator firms that held first-mover advantage in the “fund supermarket” wave in the early
2000s. In both cases, the dominant firms remained vertically integrated across two or more component sets during the modular phase, often including fund management and selected specialized
components. Thus, we argue that the product provider firms that retained integrative capabilities
(see Helfat and Campo-Rembado, 2016) during the modular phase were later able to thrive in
the reintegration period by utilizing these retained capabilities to develop a less modular product configuration and offset the higher costs of integration. This suggests that maintaining a
broad scope of component capabilities in a modular phase, despite the potential additional costs
of doing so, is essential to initiate and derive success from integrative innovation. For example, Standard Life, a life insurance company trading since 1825, has been the market leader in
the pensions sector over many years. It was the first mover to adopt platform technologies, but
importantly remained integrated in fund management (Standard Life Asset Management) and a
number of upstream software components, such as risk modeling and portfolio analysis throughout the modular phase. Standard Life initially mitigated the technology bottleneck occupied by
the platform operator through its first-mover scale efficiencies; however, it was one of the first
product providers to recognize the appropriation advantages of reintegration and in recent years
has acquired a number of firms in the sector, in particular IFA firms which have been rebranded as
Standard Life 1825. They also acquired the fund management firm Aberdeen Asset Management
to form Standard Life Aberdeen. In contrast, there have been many new entrants (and then exits)
to the sector with varying success, and many have continued to follow a modular product architecture with corresponding arms’ length governance. While many of these are venture-capital
funded, few have had the financial resources or integrative capabilities to match the acquisitive
activity of incumbent firms. Nonetheless, successive waves of pension consolidation have enabled
a few of these firms, such as Nucleus, to build sustainable positions in the high net-worth end of
the market.
Finally, our findings have some important implications for understanding the mirroring
hypothesis (Colfer and Baldwin, 2016). Considering the evolution of the product architecture,
we find that modular products are associated with high levels of outsourcing (2005–2012) and, as
reintegration ensued (2015–2020), we find tailwinds that encouraged both product and industry
reintegration. We find examples of non-correspondence that relate to firm perceptions of value
capture at the component level of the product artifact (Furlan et al., 2014; Burton and Galvin,
2020). When components were perceived as high value in the modular phase (such as in-house
fund manufacturing), these components were maintained within firm boundaries, despite the systemic modularity of the product system. Similarly, in the transition phase, when components were
perceived as high value, firms chose to non-correspond through co-development, co-location, and
relational contracting through power blocks with component firms, a type of non-correspondence
suggested by Colfer and Baldwin (2016). In other words, the notion of “value” at the component
level of the product system is central to correspondence decisions.
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configurations. However, while these efforts had some impact upon value creation, its success
was mixed. As a consequence, product provider firms switched to acquire component firms in
other layers of the IVC, significantly widening their span of control to mitigate the technology
bottleneck leveraged by the platform operators.
We recognize that future research could further elaborate some of our key themes. For example, our study suggests that the effects of bottlenecks can be minimized, even in the absence of
architectural control, by widening a firms’ span of control to downstream distribution firms to
control access to consumer markets and by acquiring upstream component firms to kickstart
innovation and secure appropriable IP. Further research on how bottlenecks emerge in modular
industries and how they are responded to would add depth to existing understandings of the limits to modularity. Our context is that acquiring the platform owner with architectural advantage
was improbable, and further research could examine how regulation in other industries affects
decisions to respond to bottlenecks.
While our study has examined personal pensions, the regulatory changes in related markets,
such as occupational and workplace pensions, are distinctively different, despite similar products and similar firms. Comparing these two product markets longitudinally may tease out how
different regulatory shifts have led to alternate co-evolutionary trajectories for similar products.
Comparing actual and intended outcomes of changes in regulation would also benefit policy debates in the financial services sector. Our case analysis points toward mixed
results. On the one hand, in the modular phase levels of competition and the choice available to consumers expanded significantly. One reading of events is that the actual outcomes were almost too successful as product charges fell from between 1.5 and 1.75% per
year to around 0.5% per year, barriers to entry were removed, and products were unbundled. The result was that the profitability of product provider firms collapsed. The way in
which product providers utilized less modularity and less specialization to counteract these
effects points toward actual outcomes that were unintended by the regulator, e.g., less
competition. Given that the regulators’ aim is to balance competition and innovation with
resilience and robustness (León and Berndsen, 2014), these dynamics deserve further scholarly
attention.
The literature on the mirroring hypothesis (e.g., Colfer and Baldwin, 2016; Sorkun and Furlan,
2017; Burton and Galvin, 2018b) would also benefit from further empirical and longitudinal
research that explores shifts to less modularity and less specialization and how mirroring plays
out in alliances and consortia. Furthermore, our study was not able to provide any substantive
comment upon the performance outcomes of mirroring versus misting. This also remains an
important gap in our understanding.
Lastly, the emergence of platform technologies in the industry speaks to the growing literature on platform architectures and ecosystems (e.g., Gawer, 2014; Adner, 2017; McIntyre
and Srinivasan, 2017; Jacobides et al., 2018; Meyer et al., 2018). Our case analysis points
toward substantive changes in the configuration of the sector ecosystems. The directionality of the
reconfiguration we have presented is unusual. Unusual cases are often useful for theory-building,
and studies that examine unexpected structures and trajectories in platform ecosystems are fertile
ground for future research.
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